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SUMMARY 
 
 
This treatise specifically explores section 198 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 
1995, which regulate temporary employment service.  However, before one can 
assess this section in particular, other legislation  has to be considered dealing with 
temporary employment services, read in conjunction with the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (hereinafter the “Constitution”), as all 
legislation is subject thereto. As summarised by Navsa AJ in the judgment of 
Sidumo& Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others: 
 
“The starting point is the Constitution. Section 23(1) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that everyone has the 
right to fair labour practices”. 
 
The Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 (hereinafter the “LRA”) is also subject to the 
Constitution, and section 198 has to be evaluated and assessed against the 
Constitution as is set out in section 1 of the LRA, which provides that:  
 
 “The purpose of this Act is to advance economic development, social 
 justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace by 
 fulfilling the primary objects of this Act, which are— 
 
(a) to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred 
by section 27 of the Constitution...” 
 
The LRA was drafted while the Interim Constitution was in effect, this being the 
reason why section 1(a) refers to section 27 of the Constitution, the Interim 
Constitution, and not the final Constitution, which was enacted in 1996.  The 
Honourable Justice Conradie held in NAPTOSA & others v Minister of Education, 
Western Cape & others [2001] 22 ILJ 889 (C): 
 
 vi 
“that the effect of section 1(a) is to ensure that the LRA “[marries] the 
enforcement of fundamental rights with the effective resolution of 
labour dispute temporary employment service . . . If an employer 
adopts a labour practice which is thought to be unfair, an aggrieved 
employee would in the first instance be obliged to seek a remedy 
under the LRA. If he or she finds no remedy under that Act, the LRA 
might come under constitutional scrutiny for not giving adequate 
protection to  a constitutional right. If a labour practice permitted by the 
LRA is not fair, a court might be persuaded to strike down the 
impugned provision. But it would,  I think, need a good deal of 
persuasion”. 
 
The Constitution and the LRA lay the basis for temporary employment services in the 
South African law context, and are the primary laws dealing with this topic. Although 
the main focus of the treatise is section 198 of the LRA in dealing with temporary 
employment services, it is evident that secondary labour legislation also regulates 
temporary employment services. 
 
It is noteworthy that each piece of legislation has different requirements and/or 
essentials regulating temporary employment services, even though some of the 
legislation have very similar provisions. Secondly, each of the pieces of legislation 
also determines and attaches different meanings to who the real employer is. This is 
important so as to establish who, as between the temporary employment service and 
its client, may be held liable for obligations arising out of the employment 
relationship.  
 
A tripartite relationship is created by temporary employment service arrangements, in 
that there is the temporary employment services –client relationship, the temporary 
employment service’s employer - employee relationship and the client –employee 
relationship, each with its own rights, obligations, and requirements for termination. 
 
A further focus of the treatise is the problems experienced in the employment 
relationship between the temporary employment service and its employees and the 
termination of the relationship. 
 vii 
The difficulties and potential unfairness arising from termination of the relationship 
between the temporary employment service and its employees have resulted in 
legislative developments and proposed amendments, most notably the repeal of 
section 198. These proposals are discussed herein, including the question of whether 
section 198 should be repealed, or whether temporary employment services should 
be more strenuously regulated in order to resolve the problems being experienced 
with the application of section 198 in its present form.  
 
It is proposed in conclusion that temporary employment services be more strenuously 
regulated, as the repeal of section 198 will not be socially and economically 
beneficial to the workforce of South Africa, nor the Labour Market.  Further, it would 
be contrary to the Constitution and purpose of the Labour Relations Act.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Temporary employment services, commonly referred to as “labour brokers”, have 
received significant attention in recent years in South Africa.  Temporary employment 
services in South Africa have, amongst other things, been labelled as “rapists”, “slave 
traders” and “human traffickers”. As a result of the negative publicity, and pressure 
exercised by COSATU and its alliance partners on government, proposed legislative 
amendments contemplate the repeal of section 198 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1998, as amended (hereinafter “the LRA”)1. This is apparent from the Labour 
Relations Amendment Bill that was published in December 2010. 
 
The main objective of this treatise is to analyse the merits of the total repeal of 
legislative support for the existence of temporary employment services, as opposed 
to more strenuous regulation of temporary employment services. As a first step 
towards this objective it is necessary to identify those laws that presently enable the 
existence, and regulate, temporary employment services. Reference will be made to 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa2 (hereinafter the “Constitution”) and 
the LRA, and how these two statutes enable the existence of temporary employment 
services.  
 
Furthermore, reference will be made to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act3 
(“the BCEA”), the Employment Equity Act4 (“the EEA”), the Occupational Health and 
                                                          
1 Act 66 of 1995. 
2 Act 108 of 1996.  
3 Act 75 of 1997. 
4 Act 55 of 1998. 
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Safety Act5 (hereinafter “OHSA”) and the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and 
Diseases Act6 (hereinafter “COIDA”). 
 
In the course of examining the problems associated with the current legal regime, 
attention will be given to the trilateral relationship between the three parties who are 
involved with the operation of temporary employment services, namely the temporary 
employment service as employer of the employee whose services are provided to a 
client. This treatise will also focus on the creation of these relationships, the 
respective rights and obligations of the parties, and the termination of the 
relationships. 
 
Finally, recent legislative proposals relating to the possible repeal of section 198 are 
examined, together with associated amendments that will serve to fundamentally 
alter the vulnerability of employees of temporary employment services. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Act 85 0f 1993. 
6 Act 130 of 1993. 
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CHAPTER 2 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter deals with the statutory provisions that presently affect the rights and 
obligations of the parties that are involved whenever a temporary employment 
service supplies an employee to a client.  While the Constitution7 and the LRA8 are 
the primary laws that facilitate the existence of temporary employment services, it will 
be evident that that the operation of temporary employment services are affected by 
more than just the LRA.   
 
2.2 PRIMARYSTATUTESTHAT PERMIT THE EXISTENCE OF TEMPORARY 
 EMPLOYMENT SERVICES 
 
2.2.1 THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, ACT 108 OF 1996 
 
With the introduction of the democratic Constitution of South Africa in 1996, various 
statutes were amended and enacted to give effect to the Constitution. Section 2 of 
the Constitution provides as follows: 
 
“This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; any law or 
conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by 
it must be fulfilled”9. 
 
Section 23(1) of the Constitution provides that: 
                                                          
7 Act 108 of 1996. 
8 Act 66 of 1995. 
9 S 2 of the Constitution. 
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 “(1) everyone has the right to fair labour practices...”10 
 
In National Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town & Others11it 
was found that the right to fair labour practices, whilst incapable of precise definition, 
encompasses the right to security of employment and specifically the right not to be 
dismissed unfairly. This was confirmed by the later judgment in Sidumo & Another v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others12 where Navsa AJ held:  
 
“The starting point is the Constitution. Section 23(1) of the Constitution 
of the  Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that everyone has the 
right to fair labour practices”13. 
 
In terms of the judgement, section 23(1) of the Constitution entrenches security of 
employment and the right not to be unfairly dismissed as, amongst other things, an 
essential component to the right to fair labour practices. Consequently, it also 
protects temporary employment service employees from being unfairly dismissed.  
This will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
Thus, in view of the above-mentioned, all legislation must be read in conjunction with 
the Constitution, so as to give effect to its primary objectives. 
 
2.2.2 THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995 
 
Section 1 of the LRA reads as follows:  
 
“The purpose of this Act is to advance economic development, social 
justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace by 
fulfilling the primary objects of this Act, which are… 
                                                          
10 S 23(1) of the Constitution. 
11 (2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC) 
12 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC). 
13 Supra at para 55. 
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(b) to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred 
by section 27 of the Constitution...”14 
 
The LRA was drafted at a time when the Interim Constitution was in place15, this 
being the reason why section 1(a) refers to section 27 of the Constitution, the Interim 
Constitution, and not the final Constitution, which was enacted in 1996.In Business 
SA v COSATU & another16, the Labour Appeal Court held that:  
 
“The reference to section 27 of the Interim Constitution in the Act must 
be read as a reference to its re-enactment as modified in section 23 of 
the final Constitution”17 
 
Conradie J remarked as follows in NAPTOSA & others v Minister of Education, 
Western Cape & others18: 
 
“that the effect of section 1(a) is to ensure that the LRA “[marries] the 
enforcement of fundamental rights with the effective resolution of 
labour disputes . . . If an employer adopts a labour practice which is 
thought to be unfair, an aggrieved employee would in the first instance 
be obliged to seek a remedy under the LRA. If he or she finds no 
remedy under that Act, the LRA  might come under constitutional 
scrutiny for not giving adequate protection to a constitutional right. If a 
labour practice permitted by the LRA is not fair, a court might be 
persuaded to strike down the impugned provision. But it would, I think, 
need a good deal of persuasion”19. 
 
                                                          
14 S 1 of the LRA. 
15 Act 200 of 1993. 
16 [1997] 5 BLLR 511 (LAC). 
17 Supra at 517. 
18 [2001] 22 ILJ 889 (C). 
19 Supra at 896. 
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In Dlamini& others v Green Four Security20the Labour Court interpreted section 1(a) 
as meaning that, where the source of a right contained in the LRA is located in the 
Constitution, a “constitutional approach” must be followed in the interpretation of that 
right. This finding should be read in light of the principle that, where a cause of action 
is based on legislation giving effect to a constitutional right, it is “impermissible for a 
court to bypass the legislation and to decide the matter on the basis of the 
constitutional provision that is being given effect to by the legislation in question”. 
 
In Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt21, Froneman AJA held: 
 
“One of the primary objects of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
(the Act) is  to give effect to and regulate the fundamental labour 
rights conferred by the Constitution (section 1(a)). Another is to 
promote the effective resolution of labour disputes (section 1(d)(iv)). 
The Act’s provisions must be interpreted to give effect to its primary 
objects and in compliance with the Constitution (sections 3(a) and 
3(b)). The Constitution is thus a good place to start any enquiry on the 
interpretation and application of the Act”22. 
 
The LRA similarly prescribes how it (the LRA) must be interpreted. Section 3 of the 
LRA provides that: 
  
 “Any person applying this Act must interpret its provisions— 
 (a) to give effect to its primary objects; 
 (b) in compliance with the Constitution; and 
 (c) in compliance with the public international law obligations of the 
  Republic”23. 
 
                                                          
20 [2006] 11 BLLR 1074 (LC) at par 10-12. 
21 [2001] 12 BLLR 1301 SCA. 
22 Supra at para 30. 
23 S 3 of the LRA. 
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This approach to the LRA was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Chirwa v 
Transnet Ltd & others24, where the court held that:  
 
“The objects of the LRA are not just textual aids to be employed where 
the language is ambiguous...This is apparent from the interpretive 
injunction in  section 3 of the LRA which requires anyone applying the 
LRA to give effect to its primary objects and the Constitution. The 
primary objects of the LRA must  inform the interpretive process and 
the provisions of the LRA must be read in the light of its objects. Thus, 
where a provision of the LRA is  capable of more than one plausible 
interpretation, one which advances the objects of the LRA and the 
other which does not, a court must prefer the one which will effectuate 
the primary objects of the LRA”25. 
 
It is apparent that from the principles laid down in the above-mentioned cases, that 
when applying the provisions in the LRA, and interpreting the provisions, effect must 
be given to the purpose of the Act by and to the Constitution. 
 
2.3 SECTION 198 OF THE LRA 
 
2.3.1 THE DEFINITION OF A TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SERVICE 
 
In order to qualify as a temporary employment service, an employer must meet the 
definition of temporary employment service, which is set out as follows in section 
198(1) of the LRA: 
 
“(1) In this section, “temporary employment services” means any 
person who, for reward, procures for or provides to a client 
other persons— 
 
                                                          
24 [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC). 
25 Supra at para 110. 
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  (a) who render services to, or perform work for, the client; 
   and 
(b) who are remunerated by the temporary employment 
service”26. 
 
In order to satisfy this definition an employer must (a) procure or provide persons to a 
client (b) those persons must render services to or perform work for the client and (c) 
the persons must nonetheless be remunerated by the temporary employment 
service. All the requirements as contained in this section above must be present to 
be defined as a temporary employment service.  
 
Before analysing the requirements in detail, it must be pointed out that three 
relationships exist simultaneously in relation to temporary employment service and 
these are illustrated as follows: 
 
 
 
  (2) 
 
 
 
 
    (1)     (3)  
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 S 198(1) of the LRA. 
TEMPORARY 
EMPLOYMENT 
SERVICE 
THE  
CLIENT 
THE  
EMPLOYEE 
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With reference to the diagram above, the numbers represent the following 
relationships: 
  
1.) The employment relationship between the temporary employment 
service and its employee; 
 
2.) The commercial relationship between the temporary employment 
service and its client; and 
 
3.) The relationship between the client and the employee of the 
temporary employment service. 
 
The first relationship above requires the existence of an employment relationship 
between the temporary employment service and the employee.  The person 
performing the work must therefore qualify as an employee for purposes of the LRA, 
in accordance with the definition of employee in section 213 of the LRA, which reads 
as follows: 
 
“employee” means— 
 
(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works 
for another person or for the State and who receives, or is 
entitled to receive, any remuneration; and 
 
 (b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or 
  conducting the business of an employer...”27 
 
The second relationship above, between the temporary employment service and the 
client, typically arises from a commercial agreement between those two parties.  In 
terms of such an agreement, the temporary employment service will provide 
                                                          
27 S 213 of the LRA. 
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employees to render services to the client, in return for an agreed rate of payment by 
the client to the temporary employment service. 
 
The third relationship is that between the employee of the temporary employment 
service and the client.  The employee is required to render service to or perform work 
for the client in order to give effect to the client’s operational requirements. The 
employee is typically required to comply with instructions issued by the client’s 
managerial or supervisory personnel, while being remunerated by the temporary 
employment service.  This unusual state of affairs was emphasised in Mandla v LAD 
Brokers (Pty) Ltd28, where Basson J held that:  
 
“The issue in casu is, of course, further complicated by the fact that a 
person who is provided by the temporary employment service to a 
client renders service, not to the temporary employment service, but to 
the client (although  he or she is remunerated by the temporary 
employment service – see the provisions of section 198(1) of the LRA 
quoted above at paragraph [6]). This is clearly a unique and sui 
generis tripartite relationship”29. 
 
However, Basson J further held that:  
 
“In fact, it is clear that such scenario may readily (and perhaps even 
usually) arise in cases where a person is provided to a client to render 
services, that is, he or she may qualify to be the employee of both the 
client and the temporary employment service in terms of the definition 
of “employee” in section 213 of the LRA (quoted above at paragraph 
[3]). It therefore appears to be one of the main objects of the 
provisions of section 198(1) and (2) of the LRA (quoted above at 
paragraph [6]) to provide that such person is designated (for the 
purposes of the LRA) as the employee of the temporary employment 
                                                          
28 [2000] 9 BLLR 1047 (LC). 
29 Supra at para12. 
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agency, and not of the client (even though he or she would  qualify to 
be the employee of both in terms of definition of “employee” in section 
213 of the LRA)”30. 
 
This judgment confirms the tripartite relationship that simultaneously exists between 
the parties. Another important factor which Judge Basson pointed out in an obiter 
dictum is that the employee, in terms of the temporary employment service 
agreement between the temporary employment service and the client, could for all 
practical purposes qualify as an employee of both the temporary employment service 
and the client within the ambit of section 213 of the LRA.  However, the learned 
Judge correctly pointed out that due to the fact that employees are provided to the 
client by the temporary employment service, the employees will be deemed to be the 
employees of the temporary employment service.  This flows from the provisions of 
section 198 of the LRA. 
 
In order to qualify as such, the temporary employment service must “procure for or 
provide” employees to the client.  In this regard the Basson J in Mandla v LAD 
Brokers (Pty) Ltd31 held that: 
 
“... even though the temporary employment service did not “procure” 
the services of the employee in question, “it does not mean that it did 
not in fact “provide” such services to its client”32. 
 
The Court held that even though the temporary employment service in question did 
not procure the services of the employees, it still provided the employees to the client 
and therefore the transaction between the temporary employment service and the 
client fell brought within the ambit of section 198(1). 
 
                                                          
30 Supra at para 14. 
31 [2000] 9 BLLR 1047 (LC) at para 36. 
32 Supra at par 36. 
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In conclusion its seems that even if the first option of the requirement, “procure”, is 
not present, but employees are nonetheless “provided”, the requirements of section 
198(1) will have been satisfied.   
 
2.3. IDENTIFYING THE EMPLOYER 
 
The LRA currently does not define “employer”.  However, section 198 resolves the 
potential dispute about whether the temporary employment service, as opposed to its 
client, is to be considered the employer of the employee. Section 198(2) provides 
that: 
 
“(2) For the purposes of this Act, a person whose services have 
been  procured for or provided to a client by a temporary 
employment service is the employee of that temporary 
employment service, and the temporary employment service is 
that person’s employer”33.  
 
2.3.3 THE LIABILTY OF THE EMPLOYER 
 
In terms of section 198, the temporary employment service and its client will be held 
jointly and severally liable in certain circumstances. Section 198(4) lists the following 
circumstances: 
 
“(4) The temporary employment service and the client are jointly 
and severally liable if the temporary employment service, in 
respect of any of its employees, contravenes— 
 
(a) a collective agreement concluded in a bargaining council 
that regulates terms and conditions of employment; 
 
                                                          
33 S 198(2) of the LRA. 
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(b) a binding arbitration award that regulates terms and 
conditions of employment; 
 
(c) the Basic Conditions of Employment Act; or 
 
  (d) a determination made in terms of the Wage Act”34. 
 
Notable by its absence is joint and several liability for the unfair dismissal of an 
employee of the temporary employment service.  Therein lies much of the attraction 
of the use of temporary employment services, in that clients who are willing to pay a 
premium in respect of labour costs are able to avoid the cost, liability and effort 
associated with compliance with statutory requirements for fair dismissal.  The same 
applies to liability for unfair labour practices. 
 
In NEHAWU & another v Nursing Services of South Africa35 the arbitrator held that 
where a client dismisses the employee of a temporary employment service: 
 
“[t]he termination is deemed, in terms of section 198(2) of the Act, to 
have  been  effected by [the temporary employment service] as the 
employer”36. 
 
Furthermore, in Nape v INTCS Corporate Solutions (Pty) Ltd37Boda AJ held: 
 
“In some cases, mentioned in subsection (4), the Act makes the client 
and labour broker jointly and severally liable to the employee but not in 
cases of dismissal. Where the employee is dismissed, the employee’s 
                                                          
34 S 198(4) of the LRA. 
35 [1997] 10 BLLR (CCMA) 1387. 
36 [1997] 10 BLLR (CCMA) at 1393. 
37 [2010] 8 BLLR 852 (LC). 
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cause of action is only against the labour broker and not against the 
client”38. 
 
Accordingly, in LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Mandla39 the Labour Appeal Court held that 
the temporary employment service can never escape liability for acts of its clients 
where the client dismisses its employees.  Where the person provided to the client is 
an employee of the client, the deeming provision contained in section 198(2) has the 
result that the employee is considered an employee of the temporary employment 
service.  Accordingly it was held that the Appellant, LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd, was liable 
for the unfair retrenchment of Mr Mandla by its client. 
 
2.3.4 LIABILITY OF THE CLIENT 
 
As already mentioned, the client will be held jointly and severally liable together with 
the temporary employment service under the circumstances set out in section 198(4) 
of the LRA.   
 
The client will not be held liable in cases where the employees of the temporary 
employment service are dismissed, even though the client could be responsible for 
the dismissal of the employees. Further, the client will not be held liable for Unfair 
Labour Practices. 
 
2.4 THE BASIC CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ACT 75 OF 1997 
 
2.4.1 DEFINITION OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SERVICE 
 
Consistently with the LRA section 1 of the BCEA contains the following definition: 
 
“temporary employment service” means any person who, for reward, 
procures for, or provides to, a client, other persons— 
                                                          
38 Supra at para 42. 
39 [2001] 9 BLLR 993 (LAC). 
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(a)  who render services to, or perform work for, the client; and 
 
 (b) who are remunerated by the temporary employment service.” 
 
2.4.2 IDENTIFYING THE EMPLOYER 
 
As with the LRA, the BCEA also does not define the meaning of “employer”.  
However, section 82(1) of the BCEA treats the identity of the employer in the same 
way as section 198(2) of the LRA: 
 
 “For the purposes of this Act, a person whose services have been procured 
 for, or provided to, a client by a temporary employment service is the 
 employee of that temporary employment service, and the temporary 
 employment service is that person’s employer”40. 
 
2.4.3 THE LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER AND ITS CLIENT 
 
Section 82(3) creates qualified joint and several liability in the following terms: 
 
“(3) The temporary employment service and the client are jointly 
and severally liable if the temporary employment service, in 
respect of any employee who provides services to that client, 
does not comply with this Act or a sectoral determination”41. 
 
It follows that section 82(3) creates a powerful inducement for a client of an 
temporary employment service to ensure that employees are afforded the basic 
conditions of employment that are set out in the BCEA; that minimum wages and 
other conditions of employment that are introduced by way of sectoral determinations 
are honoured by the temporary employment service; and that the prescribed 
                                                          
40 S 82(1) of the BCEA. 
41 S 82(3) of the BCEA. 
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payments are made to employees upon termination of employment, such as notice 
pay, accrued leave pay, and (where applicable) also severance pay. 
 
2.5 THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 55 OF 1998 
 
2.5.1 IDENTIFYING THE EMPLOYER 
 
Section 57(1) of the EEA provides as follows: 
 
“(1) For purposes of Chapter III of this Act, a person whose services 
have been procured for, or provided to, a client by a temporary 
employment  service is deemed to be the employee of that 
client, where that person’s  employment with that client is of 
indefinite duration or for a period of three months or longer.”42 
 
The EEA also contemplates that the temporary employment service must procure for 
or provide persons to the client to render services. However, unlike the LRA and the 
BCEA, the EEA is silent on the whether the temporary employment service must 
procure or provide services for reward.  This is likely to be of limited practical 
importance, since the large-scale provision of employees to a client is unlikely to take 
place in the absence of reward. 
 
It is also evident from section 57(1) that the EEA thus allows for two possibilities as 
far as the identity of the employer is concerned, depending on the duration of 
employment.  The employee is deemed to be the employee of the client where that 
employee’s employment is of indefinite duration, or for a period of three months or 
longer.  Where the employee’s services rendered to the client is not for an indefinite 
period, and that the period is less than three months, the temporary employment 
service is the employer. 
 
                                                          
42 S 57(1) of the EEA. 
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The result of this differentiation is that a client of a temporary employment service will 
have to incorporate its deemed employees when conducting an analysis of its 
workforce and its workplace policies.  It will also have to include the deemed 
employees in the course of implementing affirmative action measures within its 
workplace. 
 
2.5.2 THE LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER AND ITS CLIENT 
 
Should the employer be the temporary employment service in terms of section 57(1), 
section 57(2) provides: 
 
“(2) Where a temporary employment service, on the express or implied 
instructions of a client, commits an act of unfair discrimination, both 
the temporary employment service and the client are jointly and 
severally liable”43. 
 
2.6 THE OCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT 85 OF 1993 
 
2.6.1 TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SERVICES IN TERMS OF THE OHSA 
 
The position in terms of the OHSA differs considerably from that under the LRA and 
the BCEA. The OHSA does not define or stipulate criteria for recognising an 
employer as a temporary employment service.     
 
Section 1 of OHSA defines “employee” as follows: 
 
‘“employee” means, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), any 
person who is employed by or works for an employer and who 
receives or is entitled to receive any remuneration or who works under 
the direction or supervision of an employer or any other person”44...’ 
                                                          
43 S 57(2) of the EEA. 
44 S 1 of the OHSA. 
 18 
 
Although this definition does not clearly make reference to temporary employment 
services, it may be interpreted to give recognition to temporary employment services 
where its states a “person who is employed by or works for”.  The phrase “or works 
for” is sufficiently wide to include a person who performs work for a client of a 
temporary employment service. 
 
Section 1 of the Act defines “employer” as follows: 
 
‘“employer” means, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), any 
person who employs or provides work for any person and 
remunerates that person or expressly or tacitly undertakes to 
remunerate him, but excludes a labour broker...45;’ 
 
In terms of this section a temporary employment service (the labour broker) is 
excluded as being the “employer” for the purposes of OHSA46.  As a result the client 
is under a duty to conduct itself towards employees of the temporary employment 
service as if it were the employer of those employees. 
 
2.6.2 THE LIABILITY OF THE TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SERVICE AND ITS 
 CLIENT 
 
In terms of the OHSA, the client is the employer and therefore must comply with the 
obligations of an employer under OHSA, failing which it may be liable as employer to 
the extent provided for in the OHSA. 
 
                                                          
45 Supra. 
46 The CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE: WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE as contained in the Government 
Gazette, No 29445, 1 December 2006, in specific paragraph 72 in part 6 thereof, provides: “Unlike the 
position under the LRA and BCEA, a temporary employment service is not the employer for the 
purposes of compliance with OHSA. The definition of an employer in OHSA provides that a labour 
broker as defined in the LRA is not the employer of employees that it provides to a client...Accordingly, 
the client to whom a worker is supplied by a temporary employment services must meet the obligation 
of an employer under OHSA”. 
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2.7 COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND DISEASES ACT 
 130 OF 1993 
 
2.7.1 TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SERVICES IN TERMS OF THE COIDA 
 
In terms of the COIDA an “employer” means any person, including the State, who 
employs an employee, and includes—... 
 
“(c)  a labour broker who against payment provides a person to a 
client for the rendering of a service or the performance of work, 
and for which service or work such person is paid by the labour 
broker...”47 
 
2.7.2  THE IDENTITY OF THE EMPLOYER 
 
As stated, section 1 of COIDA defines “employer”.  For purposes of the COIDA Act, 
the temporary employment service will be the employer of the employee.  This was 
confirmed in Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck48 where the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held, after examining the history of the definitions of 
‘employee’ and ‘employer’ in terms of the earlier legislation, that a person employed 
by a temporary employment service and placed in the service of client remains the 
employee of the temporary employment service.  
 
2.7.3 LIABILTY OF THE  TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SERVICE AND ITS 
 CLIENT 
 
Section 35(1) provides as follows:  
 
“(1) No action shall lie by an employee or any dependant of an 
employee for the recovery of damages in respect of any 
                                                          
47 S 1 COIDA. 
48 [2007] 1 BLLR 1 (SCA). 
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occupational injury or disease resulting in the disablement or 
death of such employee against  such employee’s employer, 
and no liability for compensation on the  part of such employer 
shall arise save under the provisions of this Act in respect of 
such disablement or death”49. 
 
Thus, the temporary employment service is not liable as employer, save to the limited 
extent provided for in the COIDA. 
 
In Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held that the Respondent (an employee of the temporary employment 
service) was not in a contractual relationship with the Appellant (the client of the 
temporary employment service), and the Appellant was therefore not indemnified by 
section 35(1) for any action for damages.  The client could therefore be held civilly 
liable for damages suffered by an employee of the temporary employment service. 
 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
 
It is evident that the various statutes that were examined in this chapter are not 
entirely consistent insofar as it concerns definitions of temporary employment 
services, or the identity of the employer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 S 35 of COIDA. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TERMINATION OF THE VARIOUS RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter 2 the tripartite relationship that exists in the case of temporary 
employment services was pointed out. This chapter focuses on the termination of 
each of the relationships. 
 
3.2 TERMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEMPORARY 
 EMPLOYMENT SERVICE AND CLIENT 
 
The temporary employment service and the client’s relationship may come to an end 
in various ways.  
 
Firstly, termination by way of operation of law may occur. The commercial agreement 
between temporary employment service and client may stipulate that the agreement 
will expire at a specified date, or once a specified event has occurred. 
 
Secondly, the client may terminate the agreement based on breach of the agreement 
due to non-performance by the temporary employment service. 
 
Thirdly, the temporary employment service may cancel the agreement based on 
breach thereof by the client. 
 
The three types of termination referred to above will be discussed separately herein 
below. 
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3.2.1 TERMINATION BY OPERATION OF LAW 
 
A clause in the agreement between the parties may stipulate when the contract 
between the temporary employment service and its client will expire.  The parties 
may agree that temporary employment service will only provide employees to render 
services for a certain period of time, or that the client only requires employees to 
render services for a specific contract.  An act of termination by the client is not 
required to bring the contract to an end, since it simply expires once the specified 
date is reached, or once the specified event has occurred. 
 
3.2.2 TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT BY THE CLIENT 
 
The contractual agreement between the temporary employment service and the 
client may be cancelled or terminated by the client based on breach of the agreement 
by the temporary employment service. An example is where the temporary 
employment service fails to supply the required number of employees, or fails to 
provide employees who meet the client’s requirements in accordance with the terms 
of the contract.  In that event the client as the innocent party will be entitled to avail 
itself of its usual contract remedies and may elect to terminate the contract and 
recover its damages, rather than to require specific performance. 
 
3.2.3 TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT BY THE TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT 
 SERVICE 
 
The temporary employment service may also cancel or terminate the agreement with 
the client based on breach of the agreement by the client. An example is where the 
client fails to pay the temporary employment service in accordance with the 
agreement.  The temporary employment service will be entitled to its ordinary 
contractual remedies as recognised by law.  
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3.3  TERMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLIENT AND 
 THE EMPLOYEE OF THE TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SERVICE 
 
Since the client is not the employer of the employees who are supplied to it by a 
temporary employment service, it is not ordinarily within its rights to terminate the 
employment relationship.  If the temporary employment service chooses to give effect 
to a purported termination of employment by its client, it is at risk of being held liable 
for a potentially unfair dismissal. 
 
More commonly, however, clients of temporary employment services do not report to 
termination the employment relationship, given the logical and practical difficulties 
associated with an attempt to do so.  It is much safer and easier to inform the 
temporary service provider that the services of a specific employee will no longer be 
used, or that a specific employee will no longer be permitted onto its premises.  This 
may indirectly bring about the end of the employment relationship, in that the 
temporary employment service, unless it is able to place the unwanted employee 
with another client, may then resort to termination of the employment relationship for 
reasons based on its operational requirements. 
 
3.4 TERMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TEMPROARY 
 EMPLOYMENT SERVICE AND ITS EMPLOYEE 
 
An employer has the right to dismiss his employees in accordance with the 
provisions of the LRA, subject to it complying with section 188 of the LRA which 
requires a dismissal to be procedurally and substantively fair.  
 
Section 186(1)(a) of the LRA defines dismissal as follows: 
 
 “(1) “Dismissal” means that— 
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(a) an employer has terminated a contract of employment with or 
without notice...”50 
 
The LRA recognises only three grounds for dismissal: 
 
1). Dismissals for reasons related to the employee’s conduct; 
 
2). Dismissals for incapacity; and  
 
3) Dismissal on the grounds of the employer’s operational requirements. 
 
3.4.1 DISMISSAL FOR MISCONDUCT 
 
John Grogan in Grogan, Dismissal, Discrimination, and Unfair Labour Practices 
(2007)defines misconduct in our labour law in the following terms: 
 
“...misconduct is said to take place when an employee culpably 
disregards the rules of the workplace.  These rules may arise from 
either the express or the implied terms of the employee’s contract, 
from general standards accepted as applicable to the workplace or 
from express provisions of the employer’s disciplinary code.”51 
 
A temporary employment service is entitled to discipline an employee if that 
employee commits a breach of rules, regulation, disciplinary code, policy, or 
procedure which the employee is required to obey. Since disciplinary authority vests 
in the temporary employment service as the employee’s employer, the client typically 
reports the alleged misconduct to the temporary employment service.  Thereafter the 
latter is required to take fair disciplinary measures, in compliance with section 188 of 
the LRA and the Code of Good Practice contained in Schedule 8 to the LRA. 
 
                                                          
50 S186 (1)(a) of the LRA. 
51 Grogan, Dismissal, Discrimination, and Unfair Labour Practices (2007) 5th ed 266. 
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3.4.2 DISMISSAL FOR INCAPACITY 
 
An employee’s incapacity may arise from ill-health or injury, or inability to perform 
adequately as a result of the employee lacking the necessary skills or attributes.  
Mental or physical incapacity or physical injuries are examples of the first category. 
Poor work performance, on the other hand, results from the employee not being 
competent to perform his/her duties. 
 
The temporary employment service must address incapacity in compliance with 
section 188 and Schedule 8 to the LRA. 
 
3.4.3 DISMISSAL ON THE GROUNDS OF THE EMPLOYER’S OPERATIONAL 
 REQUIREMENTS 
 
Dismissals relating to operational requirements are primarily regulated by sections 
189 and 189(A) of the LRA. The latter finds application where an employer employs 
more than 50 employees and sets out to terminate the services of a significant 
portion of its workforce. 
 
A variety of circumstances may give rise to the need to terminate the services of one 
or more employees for operational reasons.  An obvious example is the termination 
by the client of the commercial agreement with the temporary employment service.  
This state of affairs may necessitate the reduction of the temporary employment 
service’s workforce, unless it is able to place the affected employees at other clients. 
 
An alternative mechanism that is frequently used by temporary employment services 
is the placement of the “surplus” employees in a so-called “labour pool”.  The 
contracts of employment of the affected employees typically provides for this state of 
affairs as a mechanism for keeping intact the employment relationship until such time 
as a new placement can be secured.  This is cold comfort for the employees in the 
labour pool, since their contracts will inevitably provide that they are not entitled to 
remuneration or benefits while languishing in the labour pool for an undefined and 
uncertain period of time, and without the benefit of severance pay, notice pay, or 
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unemployment insurance payments to tide them over.  They are notionally employed, 
but for no benefit.  The temporary employment service, on the other hand, avoids the 
risk, effort and expense associated with terminating the contracts of employment of 
the affected employees. 
 
In the circumstances where the temporary employment service contemplates 
retrenching its employees, the temporary employment service must ensure 
compliance with either sections 189 or 189(A) of the LRA, depending on the number 
of employees who may be affected. 
 
3.5 TRANSFER OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN TERMS OF 
 SECTION 197 OFTHE LRA 
 
A further scenario that may bring about the termination of one or more of the trilateral 
relationships referred to above is the ouster of one temporary employment and its 
replacement by another.  The fate of the affected employees deserves consideration, 
and specifically the question of whether or not they are able to insist upon continuing 
in employment in the service of the new temporary employment service.  Put 
otherwise: does the replacement of one temporary employment service by another 
amount to the transfer of a business, or part of a business, as a going concern, for 
purposes of section 197 of the LRA?  This is closely related to the question of 
whether so-called “second-generation outsourcing” arrangements fall within the ambit 
of section 197. 
 
The above mentioned questions were eventually put to bed by the Constitutional 
Judgement in Aviation Union of South Africa v South African Airways52. 
 
The key issue which the Constitutional Court had to deliberate on was whether, upon 
termination of the outsourcing agreement between SAA and LGM, the employees of 
LGM were to be transferred to together with the business to another employer (SAA 
or a new company) in terms of the provision of section 197 of the LRA.  It is 
                                                          
52 [2012] 3 BLLR 211 (CC). 
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noteworthy that the Constitutional Court produced both a minority and a majority 
judgement, with a split of six to five. Both judgements effectively found in favour of 
the Union, though they differed as to the appropriate remedy. 
 
Yacoob J points out the crux of the matter at paragraph 105, which reads as follows: 
 
“…It does not matter in principle what the “generation” of the 
outsourcing is, or even whether the transaction is concerned with 
contracting out at all. The  true inquiry is whether there has been a 
transfer of a business as a going  concern by the old employer to the 
new employer. That evaluation is complex enough without it being 
burdened with questions about the “generation” of outsourcing. A 
transfer of business may not be covered by section 197 even if it is a 
“first generation” contracting out. On the other hand, even a “fifth 
generation” outsourcing could be caught by the section if it is in reality 
the transfer of a business as a going concern”. 53 
 
Alec Freund, P.A.K le Roux and Clive Thompson in Current Labour Law 2012, 
summarise the legal position in relation to the SAA Aviation case as follows: 
 
“Section 197 transfers – the bottom line after Aviation Union of South 
Africa v South African airways:  
 
 It matters not whether an outsourcing arrangement is in its first, 
second or tenth generation; the only real issue is whether, 
when an outsourced service is transferred again, the facts show 
that the further transaction represents a transfer of the business 
as a going concern.  If it does, then section 197 applies and the 
jobs of the employees concerned enjoy the protection of being 
transferred across to the new employer. 
 
                                                          
53 Supra at para 105. 
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 When a business is outsourced as a going concern and that 
second employer becomes obliged to transfer the outsourced 
business to a third employer (or back to the original employer), 
then the latter transfer is in fact on ‘by’ the second employer to 
the third employer; there is, accordingly, no need to distort the 
language of section 197(1)(b) (by interpreting the word ‘by’ as 
‘from’). 
 
 All in all, the protection offered by section 197 is very extensive, 
provided only that it can be established that a business is 
indeed being transferred as a going concern.  The mere 
transfer of an activity will not suffice; that transferring service 
must be embedded in a transferring business.  So things such 
as inventory, premises, machinery, contracts, customer and 
supplier relationships and other assets must typically feature in 
the transfer.”54 
 
Therefore, so-called “second-generation outsourcing” arrangements may in principle 
fall within the ambit of section 197.  However, the further question that arises is 
whether a change of temporary employment services by a client will amount to the 
transfer of the business as a going concern.  While the Court in Franmann Services 
(Pty) Ltd v Simba (Pty) Ltd55 emphasised that each case must undoubtedly be 
decided on its own facts, the Labour Court came to the following conclusion in 
respect of the replacement of one temporary employment service by another: 
 
“In short: In my view there will be no transfer of a business as a going 
concern for the purposes of section 197 only on account of the 
termination of the contract between the applicant and the first 
respondent on 31 August, and the appointment of the second 
                                                          
54 Freund, Le Roux, Thompson, Current Labour Law 2012, The Authoritative Annual Review of Labour 
Law (2012) 52. 
55 [2012] 12 BLLR 1293 (LC). 
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respondent to provide the same or similar service.  This is a case 
where, in the words of Yacoob J, an outsourcee is contracted to 
provide a service, and becomes obliged to do so in circumstances 
where it is the outsourcee’s responsibility to make appropriate 
business infrastructure arrangements, and in particular, the securing 
of staff.  In relation to the applicant, cancellation of the contract 
between it and the second respondent entailed only that the 
applicant’s contractual right to provide the service terminates will be 
forfeited in circumstances in which the whole infrastructure for 
conducting the business of providing temporary labour will ordinarily 
remain the applicant’s property.”56 
 
3.6  CONCLUSION 
 
In terms of this Chapter it is clear that the tripartite relationship created from 
temporary employment service can be terminated in various ways recognised by our 
law.  Firstly, the commercial contract between the temporary employment service and 
its client can terminate by way of operation of law, secondly, the commercial contract 
is cancelled by the client of the temporary employment service, and lastly the 
temporary employment service cancels the contract. Each different termination of the 
relationships has its own challenges in law and consequences to the temporary 
employment service employees. 
 
Chapter 4 below will deal with the problems experienced in terms of section 198 of 
the LRA relating to the employment relationship that exists between temporary 
employment service and temporary employment service employees. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 Supra. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE TERMINATION OF THE 
TRILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous two chapters created the basis for chapter four, in that the chapters 
dealt firstly with the statutory regulations dealing with section 198, and secondly the 
tripartite relationship which governs temporary employment services. Further, the 
focus was on the creation and termination of the tripartite relationship.  This chapter 
deals specifically with the problems which arise from the application of section198 of 
the LRA related to the tripartite relationships.  Further, this chapter creates and 
provides the substance for the eventual argument on whether or not section 198 
should be repealed or not. 
 
4.2 IDENTIFYING THE “TRUE EMPLOYER” 
 
Quite frequently an employee of a temporary employment service refers an unfair 
dismissal dispute to the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (“the 
CCMA”)or to a Bargaining Council, citing the temporary employment service’s client 
as their employer, and the perpetrator of the dismissal.  This often occurs under the 
bona fide belief that the client is the “employer”, since the employee’s entire period of 
employment may have been spent at the client’s premises, under the control and 
supervision of the client’s management, and subject to the client’s rules and policies. 
 
In view of the provisions of section 198(2) the temporary employment service’s client 
is invariably able to argue that it is not the referring employee’s employer, and that it 
had incorrectly been cited as employer.  The unfortunate employee will then be 
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obliged to initiate the referral process afresh, typically at a time when the statutory 
time limits have already elapsed.57. 
 
In Mandla v LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd58Basson J held that:  
 
“... where a person is provided to a client to render services, that is, he 
or she may qualify to be the employee of both the client and the 
temporary employment service in terms of the definition of “employee” 
in section 213 of the LRA (quoted above at paragraph [3]). It therefore 
appears to be one of the main objects of the provisions of section 
198(1) and (2) of the LRA (quoted above at paragraph [6]) to provide 
that such person is designated (for the purposes of the LRA) as the 
employee of the temporary employment agency, and not of the client 
...”59. 
 
This sentiment was echoed in Nape v INTCS Corporate Solutions (Pty) Ltd60where 
Boda AJ held: 
 
“In some cases, mentioned in subsection (4), the Act makes the client 
and labour broker jointly and severally liable to the employee but not in 
cases of dismissal. Where the employee is dismissed, the employee’s 
cause of action is only against the labour broker and not against the 
client”61. 
 
                                                          
57 As a result of this, the employee will have to re-refer the dispute, which will at that stage be outside 
the prescribed statutory time limits as set out in the LRA.  Section 191(1)(b)(i) of the LRA clearly states 
that a dismissal dispute must be referred within 30 days of the date of dismissal.  In these 
circumstances then, the employee will have to re-refer the unfair dismissal dispute accompanied by a 
condonation application. 
58 [2000] 9 BLLR 1047 (LC). 
59 Supra at para 14. 
60 [2010] 8 BLLR 852 (LC). 
61 Supra at para 42. 
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Thus, it is accepted that when employees of a temporary employment service are 
dismissed, their claim for unfair dismissal lies against the temporary employment 
service, and not against its client. 
 
4.3 TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SERVICES AS A DEVICE TO AVOID 
 LIABILITY 
 
While section 198(2) seems to provide a definitive answer to the identity of the 
employer, it occasionally flies in the face of reality.  Some temporary employment 
services enter the scene when a client wishes to shift a portion of its workforce into 
the employ of a temporary employment service, while remaining the employer of the 
affected employees in all but name.   
 
This tension is illustrated by the facts of Dyokhwe and Adecco Recruitment services 
(Pty) Ltd & another62. The applicant was initially employed by Mondipak as an 
assistant machine operator. In June 2003 Mondipak entered into an agreement with 
Adecco, a temporary employment service, to transfer certain of its employees, 
including the applicant, to Adecco. The applicant signed a document indicating that 
he was employed by Adecco on a fixed-term contract defined by time.  
 
On 12 January 2009Mondipak advised the applicant that it had no further work for 
him, and advised him to approach Adecco for work. The applicant did so, and was 
initially advised that Adecco could not provide him with work. He referred an unfair 
dismissal dispute to a bargaining council, citing Mondipak as his employer, but 
thereafter pursued his claim before the CCMA, citing Adecco as his employer. The 
first challenge that the commissioner was faced with, was to determine who the true 
employer was.  In doing so the commissioner joined Mondipak to the dispute as an 
interested party.  
 
                                                          
62 (2009) 30 ILJ 2989 (CCMA). 
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The commissioner did not accept that she was bound, by virtue of the decision in 
First National Bank,63 to accept the accuracy and authenticity of any document 
purporting to be an agreement. Instead, she was required, in terms of the decision of 
the Labour Appeal Court in Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber64, to look beyond the form of the 
contractual relationship between the parties, to determine the real relationship 
between the parties. After applying the reality test, the commissioner concluded that 
the contracts between the parties did not reflect the reality of the situation between 
them.  The commissioner held that Mondipak was the applicant’s true employer. 
 
The commissioner then had to consider whether section 198 of the LRA was 
applicable to the applicant’s case. If this was the situation, Adecco being a temporary 
employment service, section 198 of the LRA would have the result that Adecco would 
be deemed the applicant's employer, irrespective of the realities. The commissioner 
had to establish whether the agreement between Adecco and Mondipak genuinely 
provided that Adecco “procured” or “provided” the applicants’ services to Mondipak. 
The agreement was found to be a sham, since Mondipak itself had already recruited 
the applicant’ services in 2000.  Mondipak was held to be the employer and was held 
liable for the Applicant’s dismissal.  
 
4.4 THE TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SERVICE DISPUTES THE EXISTENCE 
 OF A DISMISSAL 
 
Many temporary employment service contracts are couched as “fixed term” or 
“limited duration” contracts. Such contracts contain “automatic” or “eventuality” 
termination clauses phrased as “dissolution” clauses.  Temporary employment 
services make use of these contracts in order to avoid having to end the employment 
relationship in a manner that satisfies the definition of “dismissal” in section 186 of 
the LRA.  Usually temporary employment services argue that the contract terminated 
by operation of law. 
 
                                                          
63 (2009) 30 ILJ 336 (LC). 
64 (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC). 
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Under these circumstances two separate problems tend to arise. Firstly, the contract 
between the temporary employment service and the client maybe completed, or 
cancelled by the operation of law, and secondly, the client seeks cancellation of the 
temporary employment service employee’s contract at its site, often at its whim. 
 
4.4.1 COMPLETION AND/OR CANCELLATION OF THE 
TEMPORARYEMPLOYMENT SERVICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN A 
TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SERVICE AND ITS CLIENT 
 
What happens to an employee of the temporary employment service if and when 
temporary employment service’s commercial agreement with its client comes to an 
end? 
 
In the case of SACCAWU & others v Primserv ABC Recruitment (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Primserv Out Sourcing Incorporating65, the individual applicants were all employed by 
the respondent, a temporary employment service. The individual applicants were 
employed as packers on a contract with one of the respondent’s clients. The 
respondent argued that it had to release the applicants because its client had 
cancelled the contract, due to the fact that the client’s company was overstaffed.  The 
respondent also contended that the applicants were employed on “limited duration” 
contracts. The applicants were handed letters informing them that their “limited 
duration” contracts would terminate.  However, the applicants claimed that they had 
been unfairly dismissed.  
 
The Labour Court per Francis J held that: 
 
“It is clear from the facts in this matter that the applicants were 
employed by  the respondent. They were doing work at Bloemfontein 
Cash and Carry. Bloemfontein Cash and Carry notified the respondent 
that it no longer needed their services and advised the respondent to 
pay to the applicants notice pay,  severance and any monies due to 
                                                          
65 [2007] 1 BLLR 78 (LC). 
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them. The respondent contended that because the applicants had 
signed limited duration contracts they were not  entitled to be paid any 
monies. The contacts that the applicants signed, although they are 
termed “limited duration contracts”, are clearly not. The duration of the 
work has not been stipulated in the contract nor is the specific work 
that they were required to do”66. 
 
In this case, the temporary employment service could not rely on the fact that the 
contract was terminated by “operation of law”, since it could not point to contractual 
provisions in support of its argument that the employees had been employed for a 
limited duration.  In the absence of expiry of the contracts by operation of law, it 
should have dismissed the employees in compliance with the provisions of the LRA. 
 
4.4.2 CANCELLATION AT THE WHIM OF THE CLIENT  
 
In April and Workforce Group Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a The Workforce Group67, the 
applicant was employed by the respondent as checker and/or picker at one of the 
respondent's clients, namely Shoprite Checkers in Brackenfell. The applicant’s 
contract of employment contained a resolutive condition providing for automatic 
termination of the contract should the client no longer wish to use her services. She 
was advised that her contract would automatically be terminated on the “happening 
of the condition”, when she commenced her employment. After about five months the 
client informed the respondent that it no longer wished to make use of the applicant's 
services.  The applicant was advised that her contract was terminated.  
 
The applicant referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA, claiming that she 
was unfairly dismissed. She was unsuccessful with her case as the commissioner 
held that she failed to prove that she was dismissed for the purposes of section 18668 
of the LRA.  
                                                          
66 Supra at para 11. 
67 (2005) 26 ILJ 2224 (CCMA). 
68 Section 186 of the LRA, deals with the meaning of dismissal in the South African Labour Law    
context. 
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In his analysis of this decision Craig Bosch points out the following, in “Contract as a 
barrier to 'dismissal': the plight of labour broker’s employee”69: 
 
“Quite remarkably, despite dealing, inter alia, with the issue whether 
the relevant contractual terms were contrary to public policy, he made 
his determination without any reference to the role and impact of the 
Constitution”70. 
 
According to Bosch, it seems that when the temporary employment service argues 
that it did not dismiss the employee, but instead the contract is automatically 
terminated, a commissioner will accept the argument.   
 
Bosch also deals with the question of whether an arbitrator has the power to 
determine whether a contentious clause in a contract of employment is invalid for 
being against public policy: 
 
“In April the commissioner found that a CCMA commissioner would be 
acting  ultra vires if he found that a clause in a contract is invalid.   This 
was because s 77(3) of the BCEA gives the LC concurrent jurisdiction 
with the High Court  to deal with matters concerning contracts of 
employment. That indicates that  matters concerning contracts of 
employment are reserved for the labour or high courts. In addition, the 
CCMA does not have any inherent power, nor  does the LRA give it 
the power to deal with such matters. 
 
There is merit in this view.  However, commissioners clearly have 
jurisdiction to determine whether an employee has been dismissed for 
the purposes of s 186(1). Part of that enquiry might involve 
determining whether a contractual clause is valid. The employer's 
defence to the unfair dismissal claim in April was that there was no 
                                                          
69 (2008) 29 ILJ 813. 
70 Supra. 
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dismissal because of the resolutive condition. I would suggest that in 
order to determine whether there was a 'dismissal' the commissioner 
was required to determine whether that clause prevented a finding that 
the employee was 'dismissed'. Central to that enquiry was a 
determination whether the clause was valid”.71 
 
Thus, Craig Bosch argues that the CCMA does have the necessary jurisdiction to 
declare contractual clauses invalid should it be contra bones mores72. This is a 
logical argument, as the CCMA has the power to enquire into the true nature of a 
contract.  As such, the CCMA must surely have the powers then to deliberate on the 
validity of a clause, and its enforceability. 
 
In Khumalo and ESG Recruitment CC (Mecha Trans)73, the applicant signed a 
'contract worker contract of employment' with the respondent in terms of which she 
was employed for the period that her services would be required by the client of the 
respondent. The applicant acknowledged that she had no right to renewal after the 
termination date. The termination date was not specified in her contract of 
employment with the respondent. The applicant’s services were terminated on 24 
hours’ notice on the “instructions” of the client. The applicant referred an unfair 
dismissal dispute to the Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council (the 
“MEIBC”).The respondent argued that the applicant had not been dismissed. 
 
The commissioner held that the legislation, in specific the LRA, does not provide for 
the cancellation of a labour broking contract by a client as a reason for dismissal. The 
commissioner further held that the Labour Court under these circumstances viewed 
such a termination of an employment contract to be a dismissal for operational 
requirements. 
                                                          
71 Supra at 829 -830. 
72 A free translation of this Latin phrase into English means “against the morals of society” or “against 
public policy”. 
73 (2008) 29 ILJ 1330 (BCA). 
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The commissioner held that the applicant was unfairly dismissed, contrary to the 
respondent’s argument that there had been no dismissal. 
 
A further variation on the same theme is that the client may request the temporary 
employment service to remove the employee, as a result of the employee committing 
some alleged form of misconduct whilst in the service of the client. 
 
In Nape v INTCS Corporate Solutions (Pty) Ltd74the respondent, a temporary 
employment service, was requested to remove the applicant from the client’s 
premises in view of alleged misconduct by the employee. The respondent disciplined 
the applicant, and issued the applicant with a final written warning.  The respondent’s 
client was reluctant to take the applicant back into their services and as such, the 
applicant was subsequently dismissed for operational requirements. 
 
In casu the Labour Court held that, although none of the parties to the proceedings 
argued that the labour broker’s client should be joined, there were three reasons why 
it need not.  Firstly, the applicant had not claimed that the labour broker’s client had 
dismissed him; secondly the applicant claimed only compensation, not reinstatement; 
and lastly the applicant had claimed that the labour broking arrangement was a 
sham. 
 
Regarding the fairness of the dismissal, the Labour Court noted with respect to the 
terms of the contract of employment, the labour broker was entitled to dismiss the 
employee “on grounds proven by the client to be reasonable and/or substantively and 
procedurally fair.”  
 
The contract between the broker and its client in turn permitted the client to request 
an employee’s removal on any ground.  The Court noted further that, but for the 
provisions of section 198 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“LRA”), the client 
and the broker would have been regarded as the employee’s co-employers. The LRA 
                                                          
74 [2010] 8 BLLR 852 (LC). 
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in specific makes the temporary employment service and their clients jointly liable for 
certain acts which excludes dismissals.   
 
The Labour Court noted further, that although labour broking has been approved by 
the legislature, this does not mean that labour brokers’ employees may be treated as 
mere chattels. Nor does it mean that brokers can structure contracts with their 
employees to evade their statutory obligations as employers.  
 
The Labour Court accordingly concluded that any provision in a contract between a 
labour broker and its client would be against public policy, and unenforceable. A 
broker cannot therefore raise such a provision in an attempt to justify a dismissal.  
 
However, the CCMA in Solidarity obo Lehman / Securicor75held that even though the 
respondent held a disciplinary hearing whereby the applicant was dismissed, the 
dismissal at instance of a third party, being the client in causa, would render the 
dismissal unfair. In this instance, the respondent had to dismiss the applicant, 
because the client indicated that he would cancel the security contract if the 
employee was not removed from site 
 
The Commissioner’s reasoning behind the award was that, although the applicant 
was aware of the rule that “no unauthorised person” should enter the control room, 
the rule did not indicate that this included fire personnel.  
 
Further, there was no evidence that information had been disclosed to the applicant, 
still less that the applicant had acted intentionally or maliciously. It was apparent that 
the presiding officer’s decision to dismiss the applicant was strongly influenced by the 
fact that the client had indicated that it no longer wished to have the applicant on its 
site.  
 
In casu the respondent was ordered to pay the applicant compensation equal to five 
months’ salary. 
                                                          
75 [2005] 2 BALR 227 (CCMA). 
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In Labuschagne v WP Construction76, the commissioner ruled that a temporary 
employment service must hold disciplinary proceedings against employees who are 
accused of infringing a clients’ disciplinary code. The commissioner took a similar 
stance in NEHAWU & another v Nursing Services of South Africa77where a dismissal 
was deemed unfair after a temporary employment service failed to grant an 
employee a hearing after her position was terminated on the basis of alleged 
misconduct. 
 
It is clear from the above that a temporary employment service cannot summarily 
dismiss its employees at the whim or instructions of its client and that proper 
disciplinary proceedings should be followed in case of alleged misconduct 
 
4.5 PROBLEMS ASSOCAITED WITH THE CONCEPT OF A “LABOUR POOL” 
 
In Smith and Staffing Logistics78 the applicant was employed on a limited duration 
contract by the respondent, a temporary employment service, and assigned to one of 
the respondent’s clients. The applicant was informed that the project for which he 
was appointed had ended.  The applicant was placed in a “standby pool” of 
employees. The applicant referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the MEIBC, claiming 
that he had been unfairly dismissed. The respondent denied that the applicant had 
been dismissed. 
 
The commissioner held that temporary employment services may not evade their 
obligations as employers by simply making their clients assume their roles as 
employers. It was apparent that the respondent had terminated the applicant’s 
services simply because the client had stated that it no longer required his services. 
The commissioner held further that the respondent could not claim that the applicant 
                                                          
76 [1997] 9 BLLR 1251 (CCMA). 
77 [1997] 10 BLLR 1387 (CCMA). 
78 [2005] 10 BALR 1078 (MEIBC). 
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had not been dismissed simply because he had been placed in a “standby pool” of 
employees.  
 
The commissioner stated: 
 
“... the respondent cannot extend an employment agreement (as 
clause 11.2.3 purports to do) to cover the period during which an 
employee is enrolled in a ‘'stand-by pool', due to the fact that during 
this time none of the characteristics of an employment relationship are 
present. In these circumstances, the applicant's skills are not being 
utilised by the employer in exchange for  remuneration and the 
applicant is deriving none of the benefits of employment - statutory or 
otherwise”79 ... 
 
Accordingly, the commissioner found there was a dismissal, which dismissal was 
procedurally and substantively fair.  
 
The matter of whether being placed in a “pool” constitutes a dismissal, was also 
addressed in NUMSA obo Daki / Colven Associates Border CC80. The applicant was 
employed by the respondent, a temporary employment service, which placed the 
applicant at one of its client’s sites to render services. The applicant was involved in 
a fight with a colleague, where after the client requested the respondent to remove 
the applicant from the assignment. After the applicant was removed from the client’s 
premises, his employment was terminated with the respondent. The applicant 
referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the MEIBC, claiming that that he had been 
unfairly dismissed. The respondent denied that the applicant’s services were 
terminated, because the contract provided that it would lapse automatically when the 
assignment came to an end, or in the event where the applicant  would be 
reassigned to another client. The respondent claimed that the applicant had declined 
to accept offers of positions with other clients. After reviewing the applicable case 
                                                          
79 Supra at  1081. 
80 [2006] 9 BALR 877 (MEIBC). 
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law, the commissioner held that placing the applicant without pay in a “pool” to await 
further assignments constituted a dismissal.  
 
A temporary employment service should retrench employees which have been 
placed in a “standby pool” if it cannot place them at alternative clients within a 
reasonable period.  While languishing in a labour pool the employee does not satisfy 
the requirements of the definition of “employee” as contemplated in section 21381 of 
the LRA, in that no services are rendered, and no remuneration is received. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear from the discussion above that the current legal position leaves employees 
of temporary employment services in an exceedingly vulnerable position. This is as a 
result of temporary employment service raising mala fide arguments when unfair 
dismissal disputes are referred to the CCMA or Bargaining Councils.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
81 Section 213 of the LRA defines employee as: “employee” means— 
 (a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or 
  for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and 
 (b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the  
  business of an employer, 
 and “employed” and “employment” have meanings corresponding to that of “employee”; 
 43 
 
CHAPTER 5 
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter focuses on the proposed legislative amendments that were intended to 
amend the legal position in respect of temporary employment services.  Two sets of 
proposed amendments receive attention, namely the amendments that were 
prepared by the Department of Labour in 2010, but subsequently abandoned, and 
those that were proposed in 2012. 
 
This chapter sets out legislative developments relating to temporary employment 
services since the time when the LRA came into operation on 11 November 1996.  
Thereafter attention is given to the competing views regarding the future of temporary 
employment services, and specifically whether they should be banned outright, or 
regulated more strenuously. 
 
5.2  OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS LEADING UP TO THE 
 PRESENT 
 
Section 198 of the LRA is the primary piece of legislation which provides direct legal 
support for the concept of a temporary employment services. It provides for the 
definition of temporary employment service, and identifies the temporary employment 
service, and not its client, as the employer. This has been the position since 
enactment of the LRA.  
 
Primarily as a result of vehement opposition to the continued existence of temporary 
employment services, particularly from the side of COSATU, the possibility of an 
outright ban of temporary employment services seemed to gain ground.  A report in 
the Financial Mail of 13 November 2009 captured these sentiments as follows: 
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“Rapists, slave traders and human traffickers – that’s what labour 
brokers are being labeled in today’s politically charged atmosphere 
where it’s become fashionable to appear more radical than the next 
person.  
  
In a competition to see who can shout the loudest, everyone from labour 
minister Mdladlana to new director-general Jimmy Manyi and 
parliamentary  committee chair LumkaYengenihave sworn that by 
February next year labour brokers will be banned”82. 
 
These sentiments are echoed by COSATU’s submission to Parliament on labour law 
amendment bills, as submitted by COSATU on 31 July 2012. In the submissions 
COSATU reiterated the view that temporary employment services should be banned, 
as demonstrated by the following submission: 
 
“Again we wish to draw the attention of the Committee to the 
discussions that COSATU had with the ANC, and which included the 
regulation of labour broking.  This is notwithstanding the fact that we 
maintain our fundamental stance that there should be a complete and 
full ban on the practice of labour broking…”83 
 
The above mentioned submission made by COSATU, two years after the proposed 
2010 amendments, still reflects its fundamental stance of banning temporary 
employment services, even though the 2012 amendments were submitted to the 
Cabinet Committee by the current Minister of Labour, Mildred Oliphant, on 14 March 
2012. 
 
This intense hostility towards temporary employment services emanate from the 
problems which arise from the section 198 as it currently reads, and the resultant 
vulnerability of employees of temporary employment services.   
                                                          
82 Financial Mail 13 November 2009. 
83 COSATU Submission to parliament on labour law amendment bills 13-14. 
 45 
 
Over and above the insecurity of employment that arises from the current legal 
position in respect of temporary employment services, unions such as COSATU 
affiliates find it more difficult to recruit employees of temporary employment services 
as members. This flows primarily from the fact that such employees are very 
vulnerable to termination of their employment, either directly or through the device of 
being banned from a client’s premises.  They are also typically excluded from the 
ambit of existing agency shop or closed shop agreements, since they are not 
employed by the employers who have entered into those agreements.   
 
As far as collective bargaining is concerned, the fragmentation of workforces into 
batches of temporary employment service employees results in the dilution of union 
bargaining power, and significant added burdens in terms of recruitment and the 
exercise of organisational rights in what frequently used to be a single workplace with 
a single employer of a single consolidated workforce.   
 
5.3 THE AMENDMENTS PROPOSED IN 2010 
 
The vehement opposition to temporary employment services resulted in the 
publication of proposed amendments to three labour laws and the suggested 
introduction of a fourth.  The set of four bills mooted sweeping amendments to the 
LRA, the BCEA, and the EEA, and the introduction of an Employment Services Act. 
 
At the time of the introduction of the Employment Services Bill it was somewhat 
unclear what the implications of the proposed repeal of section 198 of the LRA were 
intended to be.  The Bill proposed, in conjunction with the repealing of section 198 of 
the LRA that indirectly the State, by way of the Department of Labour, would 
effectively become the sole labour broker in South Africa.  This would result in 
temporary employment services being phased out and ultimately disappearing 
 
When the various labour amendment bills were introduced to parliament on 17 
December 2010 by the then Minister of Labour, Mr Membathisi Mdladlana, the public 
and organisations were provided an opportunity to submit submissions on the 
proposed amendments. 
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Business Unity of South Africa (“BUSA”) was one of many organisations to submit 
submissions surrounding the proposed 2010 labour amendment bills.  BUSA is a 
confederation of 58 business organisations, including chambers of commerce and 
industries, professional associations, corporate associations and unisectoral 
associations.  BUSA made the following submissions in relation to the repeal of 
section 198: 
 
 “Repeal of section 198 of Act 66 of 1995 
 
This repeals the section which currently regulates TES (sic temporary 
employment service) and the issue of joint and several liability 
between the  TES and the client in certain circumstances.  This read 
with the other Bills  would be harmful and detrimental to job creation 
and employment in general. It would also be contrary to 
constitutionally guaranteed rights.”84 
 
BUSA’s foundation for its submissions was founded in the conclusion that there 
would be risks associated with an “effective” ban on temporary employment services. 
Those risks would include the reduction of flexibility for employees; impairing the right 
to choose ones trade, occupation or profession freely; risk of job losses and 
increased unemployment and increased administrative burden for employer and 
employees. 
 
It is submitted that the submissions by BUSA raise valid and contentious issues 
which go to the root of the harmful consequences of repealing section 198.  The 
primary concern was the risk of significant job losses that could result from a ban on 
temporary employment services. 
 
                                                          
84 BUSA Submission: Labour Relations Amendment Bill, Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment 
Bill, Employment Equity Amendment Bill, Employment Services Bill 10.  
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The Solidarity Trade Union (hereinafter “Solidarity”) also made submissions 
regarding the proposed repealing of section 198 of the LRA.  Solidarity submitted the 
following during February 2011: 
 
“4.7.3 Throughout the ongoing debate on labour broking, Solidarity 
has stated that the banning of practices of exploitation of 
workers in the TES (sic temporary employment services) 
through legislative measures rather than the banning of labour 
brokers is the best option to deal with the problem of worker 
exploitation and abuse in the TES.  
  
 4.7.4 As a trade union, we support the banning of practices that 
 amount to exploitation of workers in the labour broking industry, 
 but we view the effective declaration of labour brokers as 
 redundant ... as the incorrect way of dealing with the problems 
 in the industry.  
 
 4.7.5 In coming to this conclusion we considered the following: 
 
i) Declaring labour broking redundant will result in massive job 
losses for workers currently employed in the TES. Thousands 
of workers will not be appointed as permanent employees in the 
formal sector, despite legislative proposals in this regard… 
 
ii) The trend in recent past has been that the number of 
permanent employees has decreased and persons employed in 
the TES have drastically increased.  These employees are 
currently estimated as comprising approximately 25% of the 
South African workforce… 
 
iii) The redundancy of labour broking in South Africa will not 
necessarily ensure that unfair labour practices are stamped out 
and decent work are ensured for all workers.  On the contrary, 
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given the level of unemployment and poverty in the country, 
workers will in all probability still be forced to work in some or 
other form of informal employment, despite this being prohibited 
by the proposed amendment Bills. 
 
iv) The redundancy of labour brokers in South Africa will damage 
sustainable investor relations, while it will diminish 
entrepreneurship due to the increased cost of labour that will be 
brought about.”85 
 
With regards to Solidarity’s approach in respect of its submissions, it is clear that their 
main focus point was to stop the exploitation of employees employed by temporary 
employment services, albeit without banning temporary employment services. 
 
One of Solidarity’s main concerns was the “massive” job losses which would result 
from a ban on temporary employment services.  However, the union also drew 
attention to the harmful consequences in terms of a loss of investor confidence in 
South Africa.  Quite interesting is that they raise the point that the repeal itself would 
not have brought an end to unfair labour practices. 
 
Another noteworthy commentary on the 2010 amendment Bills emerged from a 
Regulatory Impact Assessment on the labour amendment Bills , is  that of Professors 
Paul Benjamin and Haroon Bhorat, together with Carlene van der Westhuizen, all of 
the University of Cape Town, who submitted the Regulatory Impact Assessment to 
the Department of Labour.  The impact assessment focused largely on the same 
contentious issues that were also raised in the submissions made by BUSA and 
Solidarity, but it went further by actually providing percentages and the number of 
employees who would be influenced by the repeal of Section 198.  It reads as 
follows: 
 
                                                          
85 Solidarity Trade Union Comments on the: Labour Relations Amendment Bill, Basic Conditions of 
Employment Amendment Bill, Employment Equity Amendment Bill, Employment Services Bill 10-11. 
 49 
 
“… the 2007 September Labour Force Survey, approximately 2.13 
million workers or 16 percent of the total workforce were classified as 
fixed-term, temporary or seasonal workers.” 86 
 
The above citation is an indication of the importance of not repealing section 198 of 
the LRA.  The South African workforce would face a major dilemma if over two million 
people lost their jobs.   
 
The regulatory impact assessment also noted that enacting the repeal would imply 
the violation of certain Constitutional rights, such as the right to choose a trade, 
occupation or profession freely.  Further, the changes in the definitions would narrow 
the scope of who qualifies to be an employee under the labour law, thereby removing 
some employees from the protection of the right to fair labour practices as enshrined 
in the Constitution.  
 
At this stage it must also be mentioned that the other amendment Bills which were 
introduced, did not alter or amend the sections contained therein to bring it in line 
with the proposed repeal of section 198 of the LRA. The BCEA and EEA amendment 
Bills were never amended in relation to temporary employment services being 
repealed and / or banned. 
 
Further, there were no amendments proposed to COIDA or OSHA, which would 
serve as a clear indication that the specific sections dealing with temporary 
employment services would remain in effect.   The same is therefore applicable to 
the BCEA and the EEA. 
 
The above is also pointed out by Solidarity in their submissions: 
 
 “4.7.1 The proposed repeal of section 198 of the LRA should be seen 
in conjunction with the proposed repeal of section 82 of the 
                                                          
86 Regulatory Impact Assessment of Selected Provisions of the: Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 
2010 Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment Bill, 2010 Employment Equity Amendment Bill, 
2010Employment Services Bill,2010 4. 
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BCEA and section 47 of the EEA.  These sections currently 
provide for the existence of Temporary Employment 
Services.”87 
 
The 2010 draft amendments suffered from many defects, and were generally 
considered to have been poorly and clumsily drafted.   
 
The Department of Labour ultimately admitted in a meeting with NEDLAC, that it had 
made mistakes in drafting the Bill as a result of the pressure that it experienced  in 
completing the Bill before the end of 2010, and that it had requested NEDLAC to re-
draft the Bill.  
 
5.4  THE AMENDMENTSPROPOSED IN 2012 
 
On 14 March 2012 the proposed amendment Bills to the LRA and BCEA were 
introduced by the current Minster of Labour, Ms Mildred Oliphant, to the Cabinet 
Committee.   
 
In a media briefing by the Minister of Labour on 22 March 2012, the following was 
mentioned in terms of the 2012 amendment Bills: 
 
“On Tuesday 20th of March 2012, Cabinet approved the submission of 
these  Bills to parliament where they would be considered by the 
Portfolio Committee  on Labour before being submitted to the National 
Assembly and the National  Council of Provinces respectively for 
adoption”…88 
 
“The current amendments have their origins in the growing “information” 
or “casualization” of work that has become a feature of the South 
                                                          
87 Solidarity Trade Union Comments on the: Labour Relations Amendment Bill, Basic Conditions of 
Employment Amendment Bill, Employment Equity Amendment Bill, Employment Services Bill 10-11. 
88 Media Briefing by Minister of Labour on the Bills amending the Labour Relations Act and Basic 
Conditions of employment act 1. 
 51 
 
African labour market over the last decade. The 2009 election manifesto 
of the ruling party gave urgency to the task of introducing amendments 
by setting out the following; “In order to avoid exploitation of workers 
and ensure decent work for all workers as well as to protect the 
employment relationship, introduce laws to regulate contract work, 
subcontracting and out-sourcing, address the problem of labour broking 
and prohibit certain abusive practices…”89 
 
It is apparent that the main objectives of the proposed amendment Bills, for the 
purpose of this treatise, are to avoid exploitation of employees and to address the 
problems associated with temporary employment services, as already discussed in 
detail in Chapters 3 and 4 above. 
 
The amendments seek to bring South African labour law in line with current 
developments, to improve the functioning of the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (hereinafter the “CCMA”), and to comply and fulfill South 
Africa’s obligations as a member state of the International Labour Organisation (“the 
ILO”). 
 
With specific reference to proposed amendments to section 198, the LRA provides 
for the retention of section 198, together with additional provisions in the form of 
sections 198A, 198B, 198C and 198D.  The Department of Labour put it as follows by 
way of the media briefing: 
 
“The Labour Relations Amendment Bill retains section 198 and it will 
continue to apply to all employees.  Temporary employment is limited to 
genuine temporary work that does not exceed six months.  A temporary 
employment service is the employer of persons whom it pays to work for 
a client and the temporary employment service and its client are jointly 
and severally liable for specified contraventions of employment laws.  
Additional protection is extended to persons employed in temporary 
                                                          
89 Supra. 
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work and who earn below an earnings threshold (set at the BCEA 
threshold at R 172 000.00 per annum).” 90 
 
The amendments to section 198, and the introduction of sections 198A and 198D, 
are discussed below. 
 
5.4.1 AMENDMENTS TO THE EXISTING PROVISIONS OF SECTION 198(1) 
“Amendment of section 198 of Act 66 of 1995 
Section 198 of the Principal Act is hereby amended by: 
“(a) The substitution for subsection (1) of the following subsection –  
 “(1)  In this section, ‘temporary employment service’ means 
 any person who, for reward, procures for or provides to a 
 client other persons –  
(i) who [render services to, or] perform work for [,] the 
client; and 
(ii) who are remunerated by the temporary employment 
service.91” 
 
It has to be noted that the amendment as proposed above reads very similar to 
section 198 as it is currently contained in the LRA subject to the deletion of the 
phrase “[render services to, or]”.  It therefore entails that the temporary employment 
service must still procure for or provide persons to perform services for the client for 
reward, and that the persons provided for must be remunerated by the temporary 
employment service.  The deletion of the phrase “[render services to, or]” just 
shortens the section.  It is submitted that “render services to” is in any event 
synonymous with “perform work”.  
                                                          
90 Supra. 
91 The Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012 47. 
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“(b) The substitution for paragraph (d) of subsection (4) of the following 
 subsection–  
“(d) a sectoral determination made in terms of the [Wage] Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act.92” 
 
This subsection has now been extended to include sectoral determinations. The 
reason for the said inclusion is to remove the reference to the now defunct Wage Act, 
since wage determinations are now made in terms of the BCEA in the form of 
sectoral determinations.    
 
“(c) The insertion after subsection (4) of the following subsections –  
(4A) If the client of a temporary employment service is jointly 
and severally liable in terms of section 198 (4) or is 
deemed to be the employer of an employee in terms of 
section 198A (3)(b) –  
(a) the employee may institute proceedings against 
either the temporary employment service or the client 
or both the temporary employment service and the 
client;  
(b) a labour inspector acting in terms of the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act may secure and 
enforce compliance against the temporary 
employment service or the client, as if it were the 
employer, or both; and 
(c) any order or award made against a temporary 
employment service or client in terms of this 
subsection may be enforced against either.”93 
                                                          
92 The Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012 48. 
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As Section 198(4) currently reads, it holds both the temporary employment service 
and the client jointly and severally liable in certain circumstances as discussed in 
Chapter 2 of this treatise herein above.  
It is respectfully submitted that this is a more complex regurgitation of section 198(4) 
as it currently stands, subject for the inclusion of provision for enforcement by a 
labour inspector acting under the auspices of the BCEA against either the temporary 
employment service or its client. 
With regards to the institution of proceedings by the employee, it seems odd that an 
employee may elect to proceed either against the temporary employment service, the 
client itself or against both.  The LRA currently holds both the temporary employment 
service and the client jointly and severally liable in terms of section 198(4). Further, 
the failure by the temporary employment service to comply with its obligations in 
terms of the law is not extended. 
P.A.K le Roux in Contemporary Labour Law states the following in relation to joint 
and several liability: 
“The circumstances in which a client can be held liable jointly and 
severally liable for a failure by the TES to comply with its obligations 
are not extended.  However, the ability of the TES’s employee to 
enforce his rights against the client in the situation where the client 
can be held jointly and severally will be enhanced.”94 
The same author comments as follows on section 198(4A): 
 “A new subsection 198(4A) will be introduced in terms of which –  
 the employee in respect of whom the contraventions have 
taken place may “institute legal proceedings” against either the 
TES or the client, or both the TES and the client; 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
93 Supra. 
94 Contemporary Labour Law Vol. 21 No 10 May 2012 96. 
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 an inspector of the Department of Labour acting in terms of the 
BCEA may secure and enforce compliance against either the 
TES or the client, or both the TES and the client; 
 any order or award made against a TES or its client in terms of 
subsection 198(4A) may be enforced against either TES or the 
client.”95 
 
“(4B) A temporary employment service must provide an employee it 
assigns to a client with written particulars of employment that 
comply with section 29 of the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act.96 
 
This is an important amendment to sec 198, as it places an obligation on the 
temporary employment service to provide an employee with written particulars of 
employment.  This will create more certainty and security for the employee, as the 
employee will have a clear indication as to the identity of the employer, the parties’ 
duties in terms of the contract, and the applicable remuneration structure. 
 
“(4C)  An employee may not be employed by a temporary 
employment service on terms and conditions of employment which are 
not permitted by this Act, or any employment law, sectoral 
determination or collective agreement concluded in a bargaining 
council applicable to a client to whom the employee renders services.  
(4D) The issue of whether an employee of a temporary employment 
service is covered by a bargaining council agreement or sectoral 
                                                          
95 Supra. 
96 The Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012, Amendment p49. 
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determination must be determined by reference to the sector and area 
in which the client is engaged.”97 
 
The introduction of these two subsections will ensure that employees assigned to 
clients operating under Bargaining Councils will not be at a disadvantage compared 
to employees of the client who are subject to the minimum conditions of employment 
established by legislation or collective agreement.  They must further be read in 
conjunction with section 23 of the LRA dealing with the legal effects of collective 
agreements.  In short this section entails that temporary employment services are 
bound by section 23 as non-parties and the legal effects which flows from the 
section. 
 
Further, these two subsections must also be read in conjunction with section 33A of 
the LRA, which gives effect to enforcement of collective agreements as whole.98 
“(4E) In any proceedings brought by an employee, the Labour Court 
or an arbitrator may – 
(a) determine whether a provision in an employment contract or a 
contract between a temporary employment service and a client 
complies with subsection (11); and  
(b) make an appropriate order or award.”99 
 
The introduction of this subsection empowers the Labour Court or an arbitrator to 
determine whether contentious clauses in contracts between the three parties to the 
trilateral relationship should be upheld and enforced.  
“(4F) No person may perform the functions of a temporary 
employment service unless it is registered in terms of any applicable 
                                                          
97 Supra. 
 
99 The Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012 49. 
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legislation in force. The fact that a temporary employment service in 
not registered will not constitute a defence to any claim instituted in 
terms of this section or 198 A.” 
 
This section envisages a registration process, no doubt intended to facilitate the 
regulation of temporary employment services.  However, the amendments do not as 
yet stipulate what the requirements for registration are, and they do not provide for 
the mechanisms for registration.  The probable intention is to provide for these 
aspects in a revised version of the Employment Services Bill.  
 
It is important to view the Memorandum of Objects of the Labour Relations 
Amendment Bill: 
 
“Amendment of section 198 of Act 66 of 1995 – general 
provisions regulating temporary employment services 
 
Section 198 continues to apply to all employees. It retains the general 
provisions that a TES is the employer of persons whom it employs and 
pays to work for a client, and that a TES and its client are jointly and 
severally liable for specified contraventions of employment laws. 
 
 A number of further general protections are introduced: 
 
 An employee bringing a claim for which a TES and client are jointly 
and severally liable may institute proceedings against either the TES 
or the client or both and may enforce any order or award made against 
the TES or client against either of them. 
 
 A labour inspector acting in terms of the BCEA may secure and 
enforce compliance against the TES or the client, as if it were the 
employer, or both. 
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 A TES may not employ an employee on terms and conditions of 
employment not permitted by the LRA, a sectoral determination or a 
collective agreement concluded at a bargaining council that is 
applicable to a client for whom the employee works. 
 
 The Labour Court or an arbitrator may now rule on whether a contract 
between a TES and a client complies with the LRA, a sectoral 
determination or applicable bargaining council agreement and make 
an appropriate award. There have been rulings that these agreements 
lie beyond their jurisdiction. 
 
 A TES must be registered to conduct business, but the fact that it is 
not registered is no defence to any claim instituted in terms of the 
section. 
 
 A TES must provide an employee assigned to a client with written 
particulars of employment that comply with section 29 of the BCEA.”100 
 
5.4.2 INSERTION OF SECTION 198A 
 
“The Principal Act is hereby amended by the insertion after section 198 of the 
following sections – 
 “198A Application of section 198 to employees earning 
below earnings threshold 
(1) In this section, ”temporary services” means work for a client by 
an employee - 
(a) for a period not exceeding 6 months;  
                                                          
100 Memorandum of Objects, Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012 22. 
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(b) as a substitute for an employee of the client who is 
temporarily absent; or 
(c) in a category of work and for any period of time which is 
determined to be temporary services by a collective 
agreement concluded in a bargaining council, a sectoral 
determination or a notice published by the Minister, in 
accordance with the provisions of subsections (6) to (8).”101 
(2)This section does not apply to employees earning in excess of 
the threshold prescribed by the Minister in terms of section 6(3) of 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.”102 
(3) ‘For the purposes of this Act, an employee referred to in 
subsection (2)– 
(a) performing temporary services for the client is the 
employee of the temporary employment service in terms 
of section 198(2); 
(b) not performing temporary services for the client is 
deemed to be the employee of that client and the client 
is deemed to be the employer.”103 
(4) “The termination by the temporary employment service of an 
employee’s assignment with a client for the purpose of avoiding 
the operation of subsection (3)(b) is a dismissal.” 
(5) “An employee deemed to be an employee of the client in terms 
of subsection (3)(b) must be treated on the whole not less 
favourably than an employee of the client performing the same 
                                                          
101 The Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012 50. 
102 The Labour Relations Bill, 2012 50. 
103 Supra. 
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or similar work, unless there is a justifiable reason for different 
treatment.” 104 
(6) “At least three months prior to the coming into effect of this 
section, the Minister must by notice in the Government Gazette 
invite representations from the public on which categories of 
work should be deemed to be temporary service by notice 
issued by the Minister in terms of subsection (1)(c).  
(7)The Minister must consult with NEDLAC before publishing a 
notice or a provision in a sectoral determination contemplated 
in subsection (1)(c). 
(8)If there is conflict between a collective agreement concluded in 
a bargaining council, a sectoral determination or a notice by 
the Minister contemplated in subsection (1)(c)  –  
(a) the collective agreement takes precedence over a sectoral 
determination or notice; and 
(b) the notice takes precedence over the sectoral 
determination.”105 
 
 The introduction of this new section is important in the sense that it specifically refers 
to employees earning below the earnings threshold.106 Further, “temporary services” 
means work for a client, not exceeding more than six (6) months as a substitute 
employee of the client who is temporarily absent.  It puts a clear distinction in terms 
of who may be employed by the temporary employment service at the client. 
                                                          
104 The Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012 51.  
105 Supra. 
106 Section 6(3) of the BCEA: “The Minister must, on the advice of the Commission, make a 
determination that excludes the application of this Chapter or any provision of it to any category of 
employees earning in excess of an amount stated in that determination.” The current threshold is R 
172 000.00 per annum. 
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P.A.K le Roux explains the impact of section 198A as follows: 
“A new s198A envisages that, in certain circumstances, the client will 
be regarded as the employee of the person supplied to it by the TES. 
The underlying principle seems to be that if a client is making use of a 
TES in what is regarded as an “acceptable” way, the person assigned 
to the client will be regarded as the employee of the TES.  Where 
there is “unacceptable use” the client will be regarded as the 
employer.  In this case, the TES may still be held joint and severally 
liable in certain circumstances even though the client is now the 
employer.”107 
The implication of the amendment is that if the services of the temporary employment 
service do not fall within the ambit of section 198A(1), the employee will be deemed 
to be an employee of the temporary employment service’s client.  As a consequence 
the client will be held liable for unfair dismissal and unfair labour practices, thus 
greatly extending the extent of the liability as compared to the current dispensation. 
Less vulnerable employees, namely those earning above a specific earnings 
threshold, are not afforded the same protection, and are therefore confined to claims 
against the temporary employment service as their employer. 
Efforts by temporary employment services and their clients to avoid the operation of 
this section are effectively prohibited, since such efforts will be considered to be 
dismissals for purposes of the LRA.  The most obvious example of such efforts would 
consist of artificially placing employees with a specific client only for periods shorter 
than six months, so that the requirements of the section can never be satisfied. 
 
The three subsections above, (6), (7) and (8), deal with the notice period which the 
Minster must issue in the Government Gazette three months before these sections 
come into operation.  Further, representations from the public must be taken into 
account as to “what” is classified as temporary services. 
                                                          
107 Contemporary Labour Law Vol. 21 No10 May 2012 96. 
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Further, the Minister must consult with NEDLAC before publishing a sectoral 
determination. 
 
Furthermore, if there is a conflict between collective agreement concluded by a 
bargaining council, a sectoral determination or a notice issued by the Minister, the 
collective agreement will take precedence over the sectoral determination and notice, 
while the notice shall take precedence over the sectoral determination. 
 
5.4.3 INSERTION OF SECTION 198D 
 
198D  General provisions applicable to sections 198A to 198C 
(1) “Any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of 
sections 198A, 198B and 198C may be referred to the 
Commission or a bargaining council with jurisdiction for 
conciliation and, if not resolved, to arbitration. 
(1) For the purposes of sections 198A (5), 198B(3) and 198C(3)(a), 
a justifiable reason includes that the different treatment is a 
result of the application of a system that takes into account –  
(a) seniority, experience or length of service; 
(b) merit; 
(c) the quality or quantity of work performed;  
(d) any other criteria of a similar nature not prohibited by 
section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act, 1998 (Act No. 55 
of 1998).”108 
 
                                                          
108 Supra. 
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Section 198D in general deals with disputes arising out of sections 198A, 198B, 
198C and which forums have jurisdiction to entertain the said disputes. 
 
In view of the problems and pressure regarding temporary employment service the 
question arises as to what the future of temporary employment service will be.  There 
seems to be two possibilities. 
 
5.5 TO BAN OR TO REGULATE 
 
Despite the introduction of the proposed 2012 amendments, there is continuing 
pressure to ban temporary employment services.  The effective ban on temporary 
employment services that was contemplated by the 2010 amendments was probably 
the result of such pressure by COSATU on the ANC as ruling party and a fellow 
member of the Tripartite Alliance. 
 
In its 2012 the submissions to Parliament COSATU reiterated the view that 
temporary employment services should be banned, which is illustrated by the 
following submission: 
 
“Again we wish to draw the attention of the Committee to the 
discussions that COSATU had with the ANC, and which included the 
regulation of labour broking.  This is notwithstanding the fact that we 
maintain our fundamental stance that there should be a complete and 
full ban on the practice of labour broking…”109 
 
The various secondary labour statutes referred to in Chapter two above of this 
treatise, which currently regulate temporary employment services, will all have to be 
repealed. The reason for this drastic measure is that the other amendment Bills 
which were introduced did not alter or amend the sections contained therein to bring 
it in line with the proposed repeal of section 198 of the LRA. The BCEA and EEA 
                                                          
109 COSATU submission to parliament on labour law amendment bills 13-14. 
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amendment Bills were never amended in relation to temporary employment services 
being repealed and / or banned. 
 
Further, there were no amendments proposed to COIDA or OSHA, which would 
serve as a clear indication that the specific sections dealing with temporary 
employment services would remain in effect.   The same is therefore applicable to 
the BCEA and the EEA. 
 
It is submitted that a total ban on temporary employment services will have a 
significantly harmful effect on levels of employment and the economy in general. 
 
By introducing the 2012 Labour Relations Amendment Bill it seems that the 
Legislature has opted for regulation of temporary employment services, rather than 
an outright ban.  The main thrust of the amendments is to restrict the employment of 
more vulnerable, lower-paid workers by a temporary employment service to 
situations of genuine and relevant “temporary work”, and to introduce various further 
measures to protect workers employed in this way. 
 
Regulating temporary employment services will result in the protection of temporary 
employment service employees, and the elimination of misuse and / or abuse of 
section 198 by socially none responsible temporary employment services. Also, it will 
ensure social justice and fairness.  
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
It is proposed that temporary employment services be regulated. A ban on temporary 
employment services will not be socially and economically beneficial to the workforce 
of South Africa, or the labour market, or the country as a whole. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The purpose of this treatise and research herein was to determine and propose a 
solution to the debate on repealing section 198 and banning temporary employment 
services, as opposed to allowing temporary employment services to continue to exist. 
 
It is no secret that the debate of whether temporary employment services should be 
“banned” or more strenuously regulated has become a heated topic of debate in 
recent years within the ambit of South African labour law as we know it today. 
 
As a result of the vehement opposition to temporary employment services, it resulted 
in the publication of proposed amendments to three labour laws and the suggested 
introduction of a fourth.  The set of four bills mooted sweeping amendments to the 
LRA, the BCEA, and the EEA, and the introduction of an Employment Services Act. 
 
As mentioned in the treatise above, the above amendment bills were introduced by 
the then Minister of Labour, Mr. Membathisi Mdladlana, on 17 December 2010. In 
terms of the proposed amendment bills, in specific the Labour Relations Amendment 
Bill, section 198 of the LRA which currently regulates temporary employment services 
would be repealed. 
 
When the Labour Relations Amendment Bill of 2010, was introduced, the public was 
afforded the opportunity make submissions in relation thereto.  The Bill itself was 
received with mixed emotions by the public. It is the writer’s perspective that it 
received more criticism than positive feedback.   The Bill was send back to be 
redrafted by NEDLAC as the Bill was poorly drafted. 
 
On 22 March 2012, the current Minister of Labour, Ms. Mildred Oliphant, introduced 
the 2012 labour amendments to Parliament.  Somewhat unexpectedly the 2012 
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Labour Relations Bill did not propose the repeal of section 198 of the LRA.  By 
contrast the bill actually proposed amendments to section 198 and also introduced 
sections 198A, 198B, 198C and 198D, in order to regulate temporary employment 
services and stop the exploitation of employees employed by temporary employment 
services. 
 
As a result of the 2012 Labour Relations Amendment Bill, it flung the debate on 
repeal versus more strenuous regulation section 198 of the LRA wide open.  The bill 
was also received with mixed emotion by the public.  Certain individuals and 
organisations are still of the opinion that temporary employment services should be 
“banned” whilst other individuals and organisations believe that the proposed 
amendments may be successful. 
 
At the end of the day the question which needs to be answered is whether it would 
be more viable to repeal section 198 of the LRA or whether to accept the more 
strenuous regulations. 
 
It is the writer’s perspective that the repeal of section 198 of the LRA would not have 
been viable.  It would have led to severe job losses, which would have had a 
negative impact on the economy. This in itself could have negatively influenced the 
investor’s relationships in South Africa.  The repeal would have had negative 
consequences for the labour market in South Africa. 
 
Seeing that the repeal would have had dire impact on the country, are the new 
proposed amendments better? It is the writer’s perspective that they are, and 
substantially so.  There will be no or few job losses; by contrast more jobs can be 
created.  The regulations will also prevent the exploitation of temporary employment 
service employees.   Also a very importantly, temporary employment service are now 
obliged to give their employees written contracts of employment, potentially reducing 
the exploitation of temporary employment service employees. 
 
Another very important regulation that has seen the light is that the joint and several 
liability has been extended, as the client of the temporary employment service may 
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now be deemed the employer and as a result thereof can be held liable for unfair 
dismissals and unfair labour practices. Further, in this regard the enforcement of 
disputes originating from section 198 will be easier and more effective, as the forums 
have the powers to interpret contracts of employment which are contradictory to the 
law. 
 
It is the writer’s perspective that the more strenuous regulation is better than 
repealing section 198 of the LRA.   
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